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Improving governance is central to improving results 
in human development. It is clear that money is not 
enough: improved outcomes from service delivery require 
better governance, including mechanisms for holding 
service providers accountable and appropriate incentives 
for performance. There is therefore a growing demand for 
indicators to measure how and whether these processes 
work, and how they affect health and education results. 
   This paper makes the case for measuring governance 
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policies and performance, and the quality of service 
delivery in health and education. It develops a framework 
for selecting and measuring a set of indicators and 
proposes options, drawing from new and innovative 
measurement tools and approaches. The paper proposes 
the adoption of a more systematic approach that 
will both facilitate the work of health and education 
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Improving governance is central to improving results in human development (HD).
 2 At 
the country and international level, there is a growing recognition that money is not enough: 
improved outcomes from service delivery require better governance, including incentives for 
performance and mechanisms for holding service providers accountable. At the same time, 
donors and development banks are increasingly in the business of supporting innovative 
governance reforms through finance and analytical work that aim to strengthen the governance 
of service delivery. This has led to a growing demand for indicators to measure how and whether 
these processes work, and how they affect results.  Such indicators play several useful roles:  
they catalyze action by benchmarking service delivery, they inform governments seeking to 
improve policies and programs, and they track progress.   
This paper makes the case for measuring governance and the quality of service delivery 
in the human development sectors and develops a framework for selecting and applying specific 
health and education indicators.  It proposes the adoption of a more systematic approach that will 
both facilitate the work of practitioners and allow for cross-country comparisons and 
benchmarking. The first section of the paper introduces the conceptual framework; the second 
section discusses a potential ―long list‖ of indicators, and the final section briefly discusses data 
collection instruments, methodologies, and next steps. 
                                                 
2 This paper benefitted from conversations with many colleagues, including Peter Berman, Eduard Bos, Mukesh 
Chawla, Elizabeth King, Margaret Koziol, Sebastian Martinez, Harry Patrinos, Harry Reid, Emiliana Vegas, Marko 
Vujcic, Andreas Seiter, and Stephanie Trapnell. Please send comments to afiszbein@worldbank.org, 
dringold@worldbank.org, and hrogers@worldbank.org. 3 
 
Why Measure Governance and Service Delivery in Health and Education? 
It has now been eight years since the launch of the World Development Report 2004:  
Making Services Work for Poor People (World Bank 2003).  The report helped spark a flurry of 
World Bank operational and analytical work on governance and service delivery in health and 
education, at a time when academic researchers were also taking a greater interest in the issue.  
That work has focused on measuring service delivery at the point of contact between provider 
and client.  By identifying gaps in the quality and quantity of ―street-level‖ service delivery, this 
measurement effort complements the essential work of measuring outcomes such as learning, 
educational attainment, and health status.  At the same time, over the past decade, a shift toward 
more rigorous evaluation has increased the focus on measuring the impact of health and 
education interventions that seek to improve service delivery and outcomes by strengthening 
accountability mechanisms and incentives for providers.  In education, these interventions 
include school-based management, teacher incentives, and the provision of information to users. 
Similarly, in health, a range of pay-for-performance schemes (and the associated accountability 
mechanisms) are being evaluated in numerous countries.
3 
From the perspective of service delivery, governance can be understood as the set of 
incentives and accountabilities that affect the way provider organizations, their managers, and 
staffs behave, as well as the quality and efficiency with which they deliver services.  From this 
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vantage point, what is of interest is how providers are selected, paid, monitored, and held 
accountable for their performance. 
Why should we adopt a more structured approach to these HD governance indicators?  
We see at least three important reasons:  to allow more international (and intra-national) 
benchmarking and spur action, to make impact evaluations more feasible and informative for 
policy, and to improve monitoring of development projects. 
Better and More Standardized Measurement Allows Benchmarking and Spurs Action 
An old maxim holds that you cannot improve what you do not measure.  Good 
measurement allows policymakers to see where service delivery and governance are falling 
short, allowing them to focus on the key problem areas.  If the indicators are disseminated to 
civil society, measurement can help build societal consensus for reform of ineffective 
governance structures and promote accountability for better service delivery.  In the context of 
specific projects, governance and service delivery indicators constitute key elements of 
frameworks for monitoring results. 
In this process, international, or at least intra-national, comparability can be very helpful.  
In many of these service delivery areas, measurement without context may not be enough to 
make it clear whether service delivery is ―falling short‖.  Take, for example, the case of leakage 
of public funds.  If 87 percent of central-government funds intended for schools make it through 
various layers of government down to the school level, does that suggest good governance or 5 
 
poor governance?  If 25 percent of doctors are absent from rural health centers at the time of 
surprise visits, does that suggest relatively strong or weak accountability for performance?   
If at least a core group of indicators are measured in a standardized way across countries, 
it is easier to answer these questions.  In the case of fund leakage, for example, comparison with 
the findings of the original Uganda Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS)—where only 
around 20 percent of cash transfers made it to the school level—might suggest that the country is 
not doing too badly (Reinikka and Svensson 2005).  Ditto with doctor absence, at least compared 
to the 74 percent absence rate found in small rural clinics in Bangladesh several years ago 
(Chaudhury and Hammer 2004).  These examples are simplistic, but suggestive.   
Benchmarking intra-nationally can be even more effective in sparking action, because it 
allows the states or regions with the most effective service delivery to set the standard for 
government and the public, while making it harder to make the case that poor service delivery or 
governance are endemic given local culture or political environment. Two illustrations of how 
this intra-national comparative approach has been shown to be effective include the case of 
Papua New Guinea, where the World Bank worked with the Health Metrics Network to 
strengthen collection of infant mortality data in a way that allowed comparison among 
parliamentarians’ districts, and India, where collection of teacher absence data that was 
representative at the state level increased media attention to gaps in performance among them 
(Kremer et al. 2005).   For this intra-national comparison purpose, it is necessary to standardize 
measurement only at the national level, but achieving even this level of coordination and 
standardization may require conscious attention.  Particularly in large federal countries with a 6 
 
large degree of autonomy at the state or provincial level, there is a risk of state-specific studies 
that use non-compatible measures of performance. In addition, having international comparators 
will strengthen the value of this intra-national measurement.   
Better Measurement Makes Impact Evaluation Possible  
Ultimately, we want to know not only how effective governance and service delivery are, 
but also what to do to improve them.  This requires evaluating the impact of different 
interventions, at each stage along the results chain.  Good measurement of governance and 
service delivery are essential to tracing these impacts and identifying where the intervention is or 
is not working. 
Consider, as an example, the case of an intervention aimed at transferring more 
managerial authority to the school level.  In this case, the intervention is intended to improve 
such elements of service delivery as teaching quality and teacher attendance, with the ultimate 
goal of improving student outcomes.   Better measurement and evaluation are necessary all along 
this envisioned results chain.  Of all of these elements, several indicators of student outcomes—
enrollment, persistence, and completion—are probably measured most regularly and accurately, 
but even in these cases we often must rely on household surveys to supplement the 
administrative data.  Student learning is typically poorly measured, and so improving 7 
 
measurement of learning outcomes is a major thrust of the education-sector benchmarking 
exercise that the World Bank has launched.
4   
The other elements in the results chain—the governance intervention and the quality of 
service delivery—are generally not measured on a regular basis.  With this initiative, our 
objective is to help increase the frequency and the consistency of measurement of those 
indicators.  In the case of school-based management, for example, this would mean collecting 
data and doing qualitative assessments to determine to what extent and in what areas decision-
making authority had been devolved to the school level, the extent of actual participation, the 
extent of teacher presence and teaching quality, and the extent of improvements in student 
learning outcomes.   
All of this applies equally in the health sector.  Consider, for example, the case of an 
intervention directed at paying provider organizations according to their performance and giving 
them autonomy to manage inputs. As with education, we have better measures of final outcomes 
than of governance and quality of service delivery.  For example, governance measurement 
might include the extent to which the process of contracting of health services was competitive 
and free of corruption.  Measures of service delivery quality could include the quality of advice 
provided by medical providers, perhaps through direct observation of interactions between 
providers and patients.  
                                                 
4 See www.worldbank.org/education/saber.  8 
 
Better Measurement Can Improve Project Monitoring 
Finally, better indicators for measuring service delivery can improve the monitoring of 
development projects and, ultimately, project quality. There are two main reasons why this is 
important. First, clients and the donor community are increasingly demanding tools to improve 
the results of development projects. And second, the design of projects is becoming more results-
focused, with a growing number of projects linking disbursements to project outcomes. 
Development partners increasingly recognize that improving project monitoring requires 
better measurement. Tracking inputs and outputs is not sufficient for improving human 
development outcomes. Instead, better measurement of service delivery and the policies that 
affect service quality are necessary to look inside the ―black box‖ of what actually happens at the 
point of delivery. For example, stock-out rates for pharmaceuticals can indicate whether essential 
medicines are reaching health clinics. Such indicators can be incorporated into project 
monitoring arrangements for investment projects and can also be used as targets in adjustment 
operations. 
The growing popularity of results-based projects also requires careful attention to 
indicators.
5 These operations link disbursements to project outputs and outcomes, instead of 
inputs. For example, in education, a recent loan in Pakistan links disbursements to the extent of 
merit-based recruitment of teachers. In health, results-based projects link payments to coverage 
and health status outcomes. These examples require monitoring of intermediate policy indicators 
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to ensure that the project is on-track, as well as of the outcome indicators linked to 
disbursements.  
Finally, the use of governance and service delivery indicators for project monitoring can 
have the additional benefit of building the measurement capacity of countries. The inclusion of 
these indicators into results frameworks means that countries will have to collect this data over 
time. This provides a window of opportunity for incorporating governance indicators into 
administrative data and on-going surveys that can exist beyond the life of the project. 
A Framework for Measuring Governance and Quality of Service Delivery 
While there is great interest in defining and measuring the role that governance and 
quality of service delivery play in human development outcomes, there is limited consensus on 
how this complex relationship works in practice.  Ultimately service delivery is only part of the 
story.  Health status is influenced by outside factors, such as the quality of the water supply and 
infrastructure, while educational outcomes are influenced in part by family characteristics such 
as the level of parents’ education.  Behaviors of service users (e.g., adherence to medical 
treatment or time spent on homework assignments) are also critical in determining final 
outcomes.  Similarly, governance is only one factor influencing the quality of service delivery.  
For example, the quality of medical care or teaching is influenced by factors as varied as the 
availability of technologies and the overall functioning of the labor market; for the most part, we 
would consider these factors to be independent of governance arrangements, at least as defined 
in this paper.  10 
 
The discussion in this paper acknowledges this context and focuses on two interrelated 
factors driving outcomes:  the quality of governance and the quality of service delivery. As 
shown in Figure 1, governance can influence the quality of service delivery, which in turn affects 
human development outcomes. Exogenous factors and other inputs contribute along the way. 








In this context, governance has two dimensions that can be measured.  First, there is the 
set of policies, or rules of the game, that influence the ways that service providers function.  
These are the incentive and accountability arrangements.  For example, human resource policies 
in health establish the rules and regulations for hiring, firing, and rewarding doctors; the same is 
true in the case of teachers in education.   
Second, governance can be described in terms of performance—the ways in which 



















the extent to which the governance policies work in practice.
6 In the personnel example, whether 
doctors or teachers show up regularly for work (e.g. attendance rates) are a measure of 
governance performance.  
Governance policies and performance in turn influence the quality of service delivery.  
This refers to the quality at the actual point of contact between provider (the teacher, doctor, or 
other medical provider) and client (the student or patient).  Measurement of quality is often 
elusive; however, recent research has made progress in measuring dimension of quality such as 
the quality of medical advice and the classroom time use of teachers.  Because of the difficulty of 
measuring quality, indicators of quantity are sometimes uses as proxies.  For example, in 
education, the amount of time teachers spend in classrooms may be used as an indicator of 
quality, if the actual quality of teaching cannot be measured. 
This distinction between policies, performance, and quality of service delivery can help in 
thinking through the role of governance along the service delivery chain.  For example, in health 
care, governance policies include personnel rules that regulate whether a local government can 
hire and fire workers, or pharmaceutical management and procurement policies that determine 
the way in which drugs reach facilities.  Whether or not these policies work in practice can be 
                                                 
6 It is important to note that governance performance indicators aim to go beyond simple ―in practice‖ application of 
governance policies. Instead they capture evidence on the extent to which policies are followed. For example, a 
governance policy could require advertising of posts for recruitment of teachers. Whether posts are advertised is an 
―in practice‖ indicator, but it does not provide a great indicator of the performance of a recruitment and selection 
process in ensuring meritocratic hiring decisions.  Instead, it captures whether the ―in law‖ requirements are being 
followed.  A better indicator of the ―performance‖ of such a selection process would be the average number of 
qualified applicants per advertised vacancy.  This is because an advertising requirement may be formally followed, 
but its purpose may be compromised if, for instance, potential applicants believe that the selection process is rigged, 
and that an already identified candidate is all but assured of winning the competition. 12 
 
measured by performance measures such as absenteeism rates for personnel, or the availability of 
drugs.  We can then ask whether the increased availability of staff and drugs have improved the 
quality of service delivery, which could be measured through the number of health consultations 
following acceptable standards, or the number of patients receiving prescribed medications. 
Similarly in education a policy that provides bonuses for teachers who work in remote rural areas 
(governance policy) may influence the presence or absence of teachers in rural areas 
(governance performance) as well as the amount of time teachers spend teaching in the 
classroom (an indicator of service quality).  These measures of service quality in turn influence 
outcomes. 
This paper uses this distinction between governance policies, governance performance, 
and quality of service delivery as a framework for discussing indicators for measuring service 
delivery in health and education. The distinction raises a number of conceptual and measurement 
challenges, including the difficulty of defining the scope of governance policies that are relevant 
for influencing provider behavior and the complexity of distinguishing between measures of 
governance performance and the quality of service delivery (Box 1).    13 
 
Another important consideration is the need to specify the level and unit of analysis.  
Governance can be measured at a system-wide level, but also at the local provider level.  For 
example, in some systems, individual schools or hospitals may have their own human resource 
policies.  Thus, a critical aspect of assessing governance systems is developing a clear 
understanding of the institutional arrangements, including roles, responsibilities, and the 
authority of key actors.  This is particularly important in decentralized systems, where a 
Box 1: Governance Performance vs. Quality of Service Delivery 
While there is considerable discussion among experts about whether to measure governance 
performance or the quality of services, in our view, as indicated in the discussion above, good 
measurement of both of these elements – as well as of education and health outcomes – is crucial to 
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In the first case, the subsequent health status of those who seek medical care from providers 
depends in part on the quality of advice offered by those providers.  It is important to have some direct 
measurements of that quality, in order to know whether health-care spending is able to lead to better 
health status.  Research from several countries has revealed great shortcomings in the quality of care, 
so much so that in a significant share of cases, following the doctor’s advice would actually harm the 
patient.  But once we have identified shortcomings, in order to remedy them it will be important to 
track down their source.  This means measuring the quality of upstream governance that directly 
affects the quality of care.  For example, one might ask why the regulatory environment is such that 
large numbers of unqualified doctors are able to operate with impunity. 
 
In the second example, the evidence suggests that a teacher’s skills and motivation are the 
most important school-based factor determining students’ learning. But these factors have until 
recently been poorly measured: education officials and researchers have had to make do with 
measures like the education level and experience of teachers, which have been shown to be poor 
proxies for classroom effectiveness. It is important to get inside the black box of teacher factors by 
measuring more directly the quality of teaching actually provided in the classroom. As with health, it 
is also necessary to measure the quality of upstream governance factors that affect teacher behavior –
for example, the extent and effectiveness of school-based management, which is hypothesized to 
improve teacher effort and performance. 14 
 
mismatch in authority between levels of government can lead to poor governance outcomes—for 
example if local governments are responsible for financing services but have no authority for 
holding providers accountable.
7 
Measuring Governance:  Policy and Performance Indicators 
Governance systems are multi-dimensional, and the rules of the game influencing the 
behavior of providers are often complex.  To focus our work, we are proposing to concentrate 
within the governance arena on five dimensions of the service delivery process: human 
resources, financing systems, critical inputs, information, and provider entry. Together, these 
dimensions can help describe a governance system through its policies and performance. 
Measurement, in this context, implies both assessing the rules of the game (that is, the 
policies—both formal/de jure and informal/de facto) in each of the five dimensions and 
capturing the effects of those rules on actual performance.  As noted in Savedoff (2009), not all 
of the governance policies will have scores that are easily rankable, since we cannot be sure a 
priori which direction (that is, more or less of the variable) will be associated with better service 
delivery and outcomes.  However, all are hypothesized to be related to the performance of 
governance in some model of service delivery. 
                                                 
7 Refer to Fiszbein (2001) for a framework for institutional analysis. 15 
 
Indicators of governance performance, on the other hand, should capture the behavior 
change brought about by the governance policy.  These are generally indicators for which there 
is a widely shared sense of directionality—that is, for which research has established whether 
more or less of the variable is desirable.   
The following sections discuss a potential ―long list‖ of indicators in each of the five 
subareas of service delivery, covering both indicators of policy and performance. The goal of this 
discussion is to provide a set of indicators that teams can draw from to incorporate into surveys 
and monitoring frameworks.  
Human Resources   
Human resources is a particularly important area for measuring the quality of 
governance. Health and education are labor-intensive services that involve many hard-to-monitor 
―micro‖ transactions between providers and users. As a result, the rules of the game that define 
recruiting, hiring, compensating, assessing, rewarding, placing, and firing public health and 
education workers, as well as the incentives that affect their behaviors, constitute a critical 
dimension in our framework. In addition, because provider compensation claims the largest share 
of the recurrent budgets in education, and a large share in health as well, human-resource 
policies have major implications for the efficiency of use of budgetary resources.   
On the governance policy side, a range of policies and practices affect the quality of 
human resources in service delivery.  These include policies governing recruitment, retention, 
and assignment; monitoring and evaluation of performance; employment status and job security; 16 
 
salary structure and other benefits; and workload, duties and autonomy. Potential indicators 
include, for example, those measuring the degree of meritocracy in civil-service hiring 
procedures, the existence and use of performance evaluation procedures, and the share of pay of 
typical provider based on performance. 
The World Bank has recently launched a major effort to carry out comparable 
assessments of the quality of teacher policies across many countries.  This effort, known as 
SABER-Teachers, is part of the Bank’s broader System Assessment and Benchmarking for 
Education Reform, which is assembling data on the quality of policies in each major domain of 
the education sector.  Until now, there has not been any source for systematic, comprehensive 
data on teacher policies around the world.   
The SABER-Teachers program tries to fill this gap by collecting information on 10 core 
teacher policy areas in education systems around the world, which correspond to indicators of 
governance policies in our framework.
8  It also assesses how well those policies rate from the 
perspective of achieving eight teacher policy goals that are shared by education policymakers 
and beneficiaries in most countries because they contribute to learning and are actionable. These 
goals include, among others, attracting the best candidates into the teaching profession, setting 
clear expectations for teachers, monitoring teachers and learning, and motivating teachers to 
perform.  SABER-Teachers classifies education systems as being more or less advanced in 
progressing toward each of these goals.   
                                                 
8 For details, see http://go.worldbank.org/MU6QMF8340. 17 
 
This teacher policy assessment tool has already been applied or is now being applied in 
30 countries across all the developing regions, and its application suggests how these governance 
policy indicators can be used.  Once data are collected for a country, the Bank produces a teacher 
policy report that analyzes the quality of its teacher policies.  For each goal, in addition to 
assessing the country’s progress, the report provides information about successful examples and 
approaches from other countries.  Country reports have so far been produced for over a dozen 
countries, primarily in East Asia and the Middle East and North Africa.  They are being used by 
the Bank and governments to identify opportunities to improve the effectiveness of their policy 
framework. For example, a discussion of SABER-Teachers in India with the leadership of over 
20 state Secretariats of Education forms a foundation for a new secondary education project 
supported by the World Bank.  
What about the government performance side?  Evaluating the effects of these 
governance policies will typically involve measuring abuse and poor work effort on the part of 
health and education workers, as well as assessing the ability of provider organizations to attract 
and retain qualified staff.  Potential indicators of governance performance in this dimension 
include corruption in the allocation of teaching posts, the share of ―ghost‖ providers (those who 
are on the central administrative records but not on the rosters of facilities), and the level of 
provider skills (actual measured skills, not qualifications on paper).   
One increasingly commonly used measure of government performance in human 
resources is the level of absence of teachers, doctors, and other medical personnel.  High levels 
of provider absence are both an indicator of general shortcomings in accountability within the 18 
 
education or health system (World Bank 2003) and, it appears, also a direct cause of poorer 
outcomes (Miller, Murnane and Willett 2007; Duflo, Hanna and Ryan 2008).  But careful study 
of the causes and effects of absence depends on accurate indicators of a system’s performance on 
this indicator—that is, the actual absence rate. Only in recent years have surveys focused on 
carefully gathering reliable absence data through direct verification of attendance during surprise 
visits to schools and clinics, rather than relying on questionable administrative records of 
attendance.
 9   
Academic researchers and World Bank staff developed and pioneered this methodology 
in a series of studies in the health and education sectors over the past decade, proving the 
feasibility and usefulness of this indicator.  For example, a 2004 World Bank study based on 
visits to a representative national sample of health centers in Bangladesh showed how important 
direct measurement of attendance is, when it found that 74 percent of doctors posted to the most 
remote rural clinics were absent at any given time (Chaudhury and Hammer 2004). Another 
study measured absence in representative samples of primary schools and primary health care 
clinics in six countries, finding absence rates that averaged 19 percent among teachers and 35 
percent among medical workers, with far higher rates in some Indian states (Kremer et al. 2005; 
Chaudhury et al. 2006; Muralidharan et al. 2011). Subsequent studies by Bank operational units 
applied this methodology to yield reliable provider-absence estimates and inform the policy 
dialogue in Ecuador (Rogers et al. 2004), Mongolia (World Bank 2006), and Lao PDR 
                                                 
9 Administrative records can be easily manipulated and therefore do not serve as a reliable source for absence data.  19 
 
(Benveniste, Marshall and Santibañez 2007; World Bank 2008). Provider absence rates also 
constitute one of the core indicators adopted in the multi-country governance measurement effort 
being launched by the African Economic Research Consortium with World Bank assistance 
(Bold et al. 2010), and they have been included in recent proposals for governance indicators in 
health (Lewis and Pettersson 2009; Savedoff 2009).  
Financing and Resource Management   
The second essential element of governance in service delivery is financing and resource 
management.  This element includes the rules that define budgets and govern the transfer of 
resources across agencies and levels in the service delivery process; the extent to which the use 
of resources is monitored and reported; and the influence that the rules have on whether 
resources are available and are used at the point of service delivery. 
As a start, governance indicators for financing and resource management can build on the 
PEFA (Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability) framework. PEFA was developed by a 
donor-financed secretariat at the World Bank, which built on the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) initiative’s efforts to develop indicators to monitor government expenditures 
and progress against HIPC commitments in countries’ Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSP). Beginning in early 2002, the formal PEFA framework was developed, piloted in 24 
countries through desk exercises, subjected to consultations, and then revised.  
PEFA surveys, which are now regularly conducted in about 100 countries, summarize 
public finance performance using a set of 28 composite indicators. These indicators rank 20 
 
countries on various aspects of public financial management, including budget credibility, 
transparency, and performance the budget cycle. The PEFA indicators include a combination of 
policy and performance indicators. For example, they incorporate de facto elements, such as the 
existence of a clear budget calendar, as well as de jure elements, such as whether the legislature 
followed the budget calendar in the year preceding the survey. Like the Bank’s CPIA index, 
PEFA indicators are scored on a four-point scale (Lewis and Pettersson 2009; PEFA Secretariat 
2005). 
The PEFA framework looks only at indicators of financing policy and performance at the 
level of the overall government, not individually at sectors. At least two recent efforts have 
applied this approach at the sectoral level, for the health sectors in the Philippines and in 
Mozambique (Lawson et al. 2008; Philippines Department of Health).  
The Philippines study, on which the Government of the Philippines and the World Bank 
collaborated, defined a set of Agency Benchmark Indicators (ABI) that assess the public 
financial management performance of the Department of Health (DOH). The exercise developed 
indicators of financial management practices, policies, procedures, and systems that can be 
applied at an organizational level and can be tracked over time. The Department of Health was 
the pilot agency, but the goal is to apply the instrument in other sectors as well. The indicators 
cover six areas: (i) budget preparation; (ii) budget execution and reporting; (iii) organizational 
management and accountability for performance; (iv) DOH-specific indicators; (v) external 
factors influencing DOH operations; and (vi) budget credibility, execution, and efficiency. These 
indicators include measures of both policies and performance. In the area of budget preparation, 21 
 
for example, measures include whether DOH has budget preparation guidelines and are 
disseminated on time (policy), but also whether funds are released on time and how the capital 
budget is allocated (performance). 
The Philippine ABI analysis provided policy-relevant findings that can be used to 
improve service delivery. For example, in the area of budget preparation, the assessment found 
that the process is constrained by frequent changes to the budget calendar and by the limited time 
that individual units are given to prepare their budgets. In the area of financial reporting, the 
analysis found that while the DOH publishes public reports about its programs, it makes 
available little of the information necessary to assess value for money. This effort shows the 
usefulness of an agency-specific tool for assessing financial performance. The ABI could be 
modified for use in other countries. 
This type of analysis of financial management performance at the organizational level 
could be usefully complemented by tools for analysis of policies and performance at the sectoral 
level. In the health sector, for example, resources flow to local health facilities from central and 
sub-national governments as well as, in many cases, a health insurance fund.  Each of these may 
have its own rules, institutional culture, and level of efficiency. Comprehensive sector analyses 
such as public expenditure reviews (PERs) and public expenditure tracking surveys (PETS) can 
complement organizational analyses to provide a more comprehensive assessment of the quality 
of financing of service delivery. PERs and PETS are also useful tools for measuring the 
performance dimension of financing and resource management (Koziol and Tolmie 2010). PETS 
measure leakage by tracking resources from the central budget to the facility level.  22 
 
Procurement and Management of Critical Inputs
10  
The rules regarding what critical education and health inputs are procured, how and by 
whom they are procured, and what processes regulate availability, quality, and cost constitute 
another important dimension of governance systems. While health and education services require 
many inputs, textbooks and especially pharmaceuticals are often considered critical for quality of 
service.  Here we discuss indicators related to pharmaceuticals, an area in which there has been 
particular interest both at the international and national level in many developing countries. 
The World Health Organization has developed a methodology for assessing the 
transparency of pharmaceutical policies that can serve as a useful example of a multi-
dimensional, expert-opinion-based system of measurement of governance policies. It covers 8 
dimensions: medicines registration, licensing of pharmaceutical establishments, inspections of 
those establishments, control of medicine promotion, control of clinical trials, selection of 
medicines, procurement and distribution (World Health Organization 2009).  
In each of these dimensions, the WHO defined a set of indicators to assess the 
transparency of the policies that govern that specific area. For example, for the area of medicines 
registration, the assessment considers such questions as:  
  Is there an up-to-date list of all registered pharmaceutical products available in the 
country?  
  Does it provide a minimum level of information?  
                                                 
10 Health indicators draw from WHO, 2008. 23 
 
  Is there a standard application form publicly available for submission of applications 
for registration of medicinal products?  
  Is there a functioning formal committee involved in the assessment of the applications 
for registration of pharmaceutical products?  
  Are there clear written criteria for selecting the members of the committee?   
In the area of procurement, the WHO considers whether there is written guidance for 
procurement office staff on the type of procurement method to be used for different types of 
products, or if there is a formal appeals process for applicants who have their bids rejected.  
Similarly, it asks whether there is a tender committee and, if so, whether the key functions of the 
procurement office and those of the tender committee are clearly separated. Scores are defined 
for each indicator and aggregated for each dimension. 
The explicit assumption of the WHO approach is that these governance policies (focused 
on transparency) define the system’s degree of vulnerability to corruption. The methodology has 
been applied to 25 developing countries.  The findings of those assessments are summarized in a 
recent report, which finds that the dimensions of greatest vulnerability are inspection, promotion, 
and selection (Kohler and Bahdadi-Sabeti 2011).  Perhaps surprisingly, it identifies procurement 
and distribution as the areas with the least vulnerability to corruption. 
There have also been efforts to develop performance indicators related to 
pharmaceuticals. One area of performance that has received attention is the share of 
pharmaceutical sales that consist of counterfeit drugs. This indicator reflects the quality of the 
drug supply and the effectiveness of quality assurance policies such as inspections. 
A USAID project called "Promoting the Quality of Medicines" collects and test samples 
of drugs at various outlets in many countries, to check for counterfeit drugs, and then publishes 24 
 
the findings in a database
11. This database provides detailed information, including the stated 
name of manufacturer and lot number, dates of collection and testing, types of tests performed, 
and names of the testing facilities. The Pharmaceutical Security Institute also collects 
information on incident trends, although its database is less detailed. 
Stock-out rates (absence) of essential drugs in health facilities are a much-cited indicator 
of the availability of essential drugs in health facilities. When measured over enough time, this 
indicator can help assessing whether absence of drugs reflects a supply or a demand issue. Not 
all factors influencing stock-out rates are related to governance, but given the often serious 
problems of abuse that plague the distribution and use of pharmaceuticals, the policies discussed 
above are expected to influence stock-out rates.   
The World Health Organization (WHO), in collaboration with the global NGO Health 
Action International (HAI), compiles data on the prices and availability of essential medicines in 
many countries. HAI collects data on price and availability on a list of essential medicines 
(defined by WHO) through surveys carried out in six different regions in each country. In larger 
countries, it collects data at the state level. The sample consists of medicine outlets in the public, 
private, and other (non-profit) sectors in the country. The survey data are available to the public 
through a database maintained by HAI.
12 The database contains information on drug pricing and 
availability for 49 countries with 15 from Sub-Saharan Africa, 7 from Latin America and 
                                                 
11 See http://www.usp.org/worldwide/medQualityDatabase/ 
12 http://www.haiweb.org/MedPriceDatabase/ 25 
 
Caribbean, 12 from Middle East and North Africa, 6 from Europe and Central Asia, 3 from 
South Asia, and 6 from East Asia and Pacific regions.  
The focus on stock-out rates can also be seen in the active campaign by non-
governmental organization in several African countries.
13 Using SMS technology, these NGOs 
collect disaggregated stock-out indicators, which they then present and disseminate in creative 
graphical form. 
Information  
Decisions and behaviors of the various actors along the service delivery chain are based 
on the information that those actors have on inputs, outputs, and outcomes.  The rules regarding 
which information is collected and made available, as well as the availability, reliability, and 
timeliness of that information, can influence governance performance. Other important factors 
include the extent to which the views of current and potential users are captured and considered 
in the design and implementation of services (for example through grievance processes or 
participation mechanisms such as school committees or) and the level of access that beneficiaries 
have to information about services (for example through publication of test scores of individual 
schools). Governance indicators in the area of information can therefore look at the quantity and 
quality of information available; the amount of access to information for stakeholders; and the 
availability of feedback mechanisms. 
                                                 
13 See http://www.stockouts.org.  26 
 
On the policy side, the existence of a legal framework providing for transparency is 
thought to strengthen accountability by disseminating to citizens information about their rights, 
and service standards and performance.  So far 80 countries have adopted access-to-information 
Laws, and approximately 50 have access-to-information rights included in their constitutions.
 14  
This raises the question of whether and how the existence of such legislation affects service 
delivery at the sectoral level, and what indicators of information access—both of policy and 
performance—can and should be monitored.  
The World Bank and the NGO Global Integrity have developed a set of indicators for 
assessing transparency and access to information at the sector level in health and education.
15 
These indicators were tested in FYR Macedonia and will be collected in Ukraine and Kenya in 
2011. The survey uses an expert assessment methodology based on interviews with teachers and 
doctors and parents and users of health services. The indicators are clustered around four 
dimensions of information access to health and education service delivery:  
  Existence and Usability of Information assesses the availability, accessibility, and 
usability of information on health and education services, including whether information 
on quality of performance is accessible in user-friendly format and whether information 
is standardized in a way that makes it comparable across providers. 
  Redress Mechanisms looks at the availability and accessibility of complaints-handling 
mechanisms and institutions, as well as the time taken to lodge a complaint. 
  Availability of Fiscal/Budget Information looks at the availability of basic fiscal and 
budgetary information that would theoretically allow local citizens (often through 
                                                 
14 See http://right2info.org/constitutional-protections-of-the-right-to  
15 Details are available at http://commons.globalintegrity.org/2011/01/new-data-information-access-in-health.html. 27 
 
intermediaries such as CSOs and media) to monitor service delivery resource flows and 
the allocation of funds. 
  Citizen Participation in Local Decision-Making examines the existence and effectiveness 
of formal consultative mechanisms, as well as other informal mechanisms that could 
theoretically convey citizens’ concerns effectively to policymakers. 
The indicators look both at policies (including the existence of formal provisions for making 
information available and redress mechanisms) and at performance (whether people access 
information and file complaints in practice).   
The indicators are useful for mapping and identifying what information related to rights, 
institutions, and mechanisms is available and how effective the system is at providing health- 
and education-related information to the beneficiaries of services. In the case of FYR 
Macedonia, the data show a considerable gap between information access laws affecting 
education and health services and their implementation and enforcement. While a substantial 
portion of the relevant legal framework is in place, significant work remains to be done to 
implement the legislation.  
For example, although the public has the legal right in Macedonia to access school 
budgets, this right is regulated by a budget law rather than a law on education. As a consequence, 
while budgets are made available to the public, they do not include full details such as an 
itemized list of budget allocations. The data identified a similar disconnect on complaint 
mechanisms. While a Law on Ombudsman provides a redress channel, it is not widely used for 
problems with services, and people are more likely to complain informally to family and through 
their local networks.  28 
 
Provider Entry 
The ability of new providers to enter the market for health and education services can be 
an important determinant of outcomes in the sectors.  Private non-profit and for-profit providers, 
as well as new public-sector entrants (such as charter schools), can affect the quality of service 
delivery in two ways:  by providing care directly, and by exerting competitive pressures and 
spurring behavioral change in public providers.  These effects can be either positive or negative 
and reflect a trade-off between quality control and competition. On the one hand, requirements 
for entry can ensure that only qualified service providers practice; on the other hand, 
requirements that are poorly designed or applied may prevent qualified schools or health clinics 
from practice.  
Few studies have assessed the overall conditions for provider entry into the delivery of 
health and education services.
16 General indicators of ease of starting and running a business, 
such as those taken from the World Bank Doing Business survey, may capture some of the 
general business climate variables that could affect whether it is feasible and potentially 
profitable to run a (for-profit) school. But they do not provide a solid basis to understand either 
governance policies or performance in health and education with the necessary granularity. 
                                                 
16 Harding and Preker (2003) discuss the core elements of such an assessment for health services. An example of the 
conditions for private-sector involvement in health delivery  can be found among the indicators for USAID’s PSP-
One program in health (Private Sector Partnerships-One Project 2005). Similarly, African Private Schools 
Investment Index (School Ventures and Economist Intelligence Unit 2008) provides an assessment of the ease of 
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A very recent effort to generate and collect indicators of how governments engage with 
the private sector to improve health in Africa (International Finance Corporation (IFC) 2011) 
provides a number of indicators that would be useful for our proposed measurement framework. 
Their assessment is broader in purpose and covers a range of domains (including the existence 
and nature of a policy framework and dialogue on private sector issues).  
Two of the IFC’s domains are of particular relevance for our purposes. The first assesses 
the inclusion of the private sector in the national health information system—one of the most 
basic indicators of whether private providers are truly incorporated into a health system. They 
find that in 12 out of 45 countries, private providers are not mandated by law or regulation to 
provide health authorities with basic information such as births or deaths or health service 
utilization data. Out of the 33 countries that do have the mandate, the information reaches the 
ministry in only three. They go on to argue that in some cases requirements are onerous, which 
may explain the low rate of compliance.
17 These findings imply that both the lack of information 
policies and the inadequacy of those that do exist is weakening governance performance, as 
measured by the availability of basic information on private sector provision. 
The second relevant domain in the IFC framework examines regulations governing the 
quality of private provision. This domain assesses whether a country sets requirements for 
registering a private clinic, has procedures for inspecting those clinics, and has standardized rules 
for operating a private clinic. It also assesses the quality of those rules and procedures, for 
                                                 
17 In the case of Burundi, for example, the requirement involves completing 27 forms per month. 30 
 
example by determining whether the registry is updated regularly and whether the rules for 
operation are appropriate and reasonable. The assessment indicates that overly complex 
frameworks that are contradictory or cannot be implemented as intended create uncertainty and 
opportunities for arbitrary enforcement. The report argues that even private providers complain 
about the lack of oversight, which allows low-quality providers to continue to operate. 
While it relies on surveys of experts in each country for information on both governance 
policies and performance, the IFC study tries to ensure comparability by providing a detailed and 
clear set of coding principles for all indicators. 
Measuring Service Quality:  A Parallel and Related Agenda    
At the same time, governments and donors will need indicators of the quality of service 
delivery.  Conceptually, what we want is a set of indicators that let us know how effective the 
delivery of services is—in effect, how much the services can be expected to improve the health 
or education of the client.  These quality measures can differ from the governance performance 
measures described in the previous section, because other non-governance factors also affect 
quality (as represented in Figure 1).  The line separating these indicators from the governance 
performance indicators is a blurry one, but it is useful to try to distinguish the two.  For example, 
an important determinant of the quality of schooling could be whether or not there is a roof over 
the students’ heads. While the availability of school buildings ultimately depends on governance, 
it would be a stretch to consider this one of the short- or medium-term ―governance 31 
 
performance‖ variables.  Our quality measure could implicitly take into account the effects of 
having or not having a roof, whereas the governance performance indictors would not. 
Service-quality indicators that have been used so far are of two types—objective and 
subjective. 
Objective Indicators 
Measuring the quality of service delivery is challenging.  Even measures of governance 
performance, though only recently developed, have received more attention than quality 
measures.  What do we know about how to measure service quality objectively? 
In health, a set of recent studies has tried to measure the quality of health care delivered 
by observing doctor behavior (summarized in Das, Hammer, and Leonard 2008).  These studies 
focus on sets of symptoms for which the appropriate treatment is clearly known, so that they can 
assess doctors’ performance against an objective standard.  This allows comparison of quality 
across different sectors and environments—public vs. private clinics, for example, or rural vs. 
urban.  Governance factors affect quality of care, but so could other dimensions like the clinic 
location and environment. 
An important contribution of these studies is their ability to distinguish the twin 
determinants of quality of care by providers:  skill and effort.  Specifically, the studies use 
medical ―vignettes‖ (or hypothetical cases) to measure the doctors’ knowledge of appropriate 
treatments, but then directly observe those doctors’ dealings with patients to see whether the 
doctors apply this knowledge.  They take the gap between knowledge and practice to indicate 32 
 
weaknesses in providers’ effort, which is a crucial dimension of quality of care. Effort can also 
be considered an indicator of governance performance, as it is influenced by incentive 
arrangements (such as fees for service or performance bonuses), although other factors like 
intrinsic motivation also affect it. 
In education, there are corresponding measures of the quality of teaching, gathered 
through classroom observation studies.  One such indicator is time on task—the total amount of 
time that teachers are actively engaged in teaching and students are actively learning (for 
example, Abadzi 2006).  Most observers will agree that schooling is likely to be more effective 
when teachers are able to devote less time to maintaining discipline or carrying out 
administrative tasks and more time to teaching.  However, a concern with time-on-task studies is 
the amount of variation by enumerator. It is difficult for researchers to agree on how to 
categorize how teachers spend their time in the classroom. Beyond time on task, if we are willing 
to make assumptions about the most effective pedagogy (for example, by prioritizing ―active 
learning‖), then the time-on-task metrics could be made more detailed by measuring the amount 
of time spent on good pedagogy.  These metrics could be used to construct more direct 
assessments of the quality of teaching as indicators of quality of education services. 
Subjective Quality Measures 
A second type of indicators is measures of satisfaction of the clients or recipients of 
health and education services.  These subjective measures can proxy for measuring actual quality 
of services and can also measure the responsiveness of services to the needs and preferences of 
clients. In the case of health services, we can survey patients about their experience, for example 33 
 
through exit interviews at clinics.  In the case of education, one could survey the students, but it 
also makes sense to survey parents and other stakeholders (including employers) for their 
opinions of how well schools are functioning.   
Such indicators need to be interpreted with caution, for several reasons.  First, to take the 
education example, parents may have different objectives for their children’s education than 
society as a whole does.  Especially given that public provision of services is often justified by 
the presence of externalities, it would be theoretically inconsistent to argue that the user’s 
subjective measures capture all desired outcomes.  For example, parents may be happy with a 
teacher who reinforces traditional gender roles even as the government tries to open up 
opportunities for girls (or vice versa).  Second, even if parents and society share the same goal—
such as more rapid student learning—parents may have been conditioned to have low 
expectations, leading them to report high satisfaction despite poor schooling.  A third reason for 
caution is information asymmetries; these may be especially important in health services where 
providers have technical information and expertise that patients lack. As a result, patients’ 
perceptions of whether they are receiving quality care may be based on factors not relevant to 
technical quality. For example, they may believe they are receiving quality care if the clinic is 
clean and the doctor is friendly, even if the doctor prescribes the wrong medications. 
Despite these concerns, there is value in measuring users’ opinions as a complement to 
the objective measurements.  Ultimately, users should know at least what increases their utility 
better than the government or researchers will, as long as we take account of the possible biases 
noted above.  Inconsistencies between the two types of indicators could be a useful warning flag 34 
 
about possible measurement problems in the objective measures, or at least a prompt for deeper 
investigation.    
One possible subjective indicator of service delivery quality would be reports of 
problems taken from international surveys of individual respondents. An example is the 
questions fielded by Gallup in a sample of countries in 2003-2006, which asked about the 
incidence of problems including poor teaching, overcrowded classrooms, school facilities in poor 
condition, lack of drugs, and disrespectful staff.
18  Because they are included in general-purpose 
surveys, these questions will typically not yield detailed information, but may serve as a general 
barometer of quality of services.  A second set of indicators would be the results of household 
survey modules on availability and quality of services.  Household surveys could go into more 
depth than the polling-style surveys, and could produce more rigorously quantitative measures of 
performance.        
Conclusion and Next Steps 
In this paper, we have laid out a rationale and framework for constructing indicators of 
the quality of governance policies and performance in the health and education sectors, as well as 
the quality of service delivery itself in those sectors.  We have also begun to fill in this 
framework by suggesting candidate governance indicators (both policy and performance) in five 
key areas—human resources, financing and management, information, provision of critical 
                                                 
18 The survey also included questions on provider absenteeism, which could be used under the ―governance 
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inputs, and provider entry—as well as a smaller number of possible indicators of service delivery 
quality.   
To advance this agenda, the next step will be to begin gathering the data for these 
indicators more systematically. To do so effectively, it will be necessary to develop new 
instruments, and to make use of multiple types of instruments rather than trying to rely on one or 
a handful. Governance involves a complex set of processes that require different measurement 
approaches; moreover, much can be gained from cross-checking different sources. There are 
many promising instruments for collecting data:  facility surveys such as Public Expenditures 
Tracking Surveys (Reinikka and Smith 2004), expert surveys on system variables, household 
surveys, secondary sources, administrative data, and qualitative studies.  Describing these 
instruments is beyond the scope of this paper, but two recent surveys—Lindelow and Wagstaff 
(2008) and Amin and Chaudhury (2008)—offer excellent detailed discussions of instruments and 
methodologies appropriate for the health and education sectors, respectively.
19  
A second set of questions concerns who should carry out the data collection, and how 
often.  Is it better to have the government collect data for these indicators, or to rely on an NGO 
or other outside actor?  And should data collection and indicator production and dissemination be 
occasional one-off events, to raise awareness and set some benchmarks, or institutionalized 
elements of regular monitoring activities?  While there are tradeoffs in each case, what is most 
                                                 
19 The edited volume by Amin, Das, and Goldstein (2008) reviews the instruments and lessons from their application 
to various cases.  See also the working-paper version of this paper, which discusses the issue in more detail. 36 
 
important is not coming to consensus on these details, but agreeing that it is time to begin the 
process of collecting governance and quality indicators in service delivery.   
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